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Impact of Military Expenditures on Third World Debt 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
ABSTRACT 
The general purpose of this paper is to determine the main causes of Third World 
external public debt, and in particular the role military expenditures have played in con-
tributing to that debt. For purposes of analysis, it was found useful to separate devewping 
countries into two groups. The first were classified as largely undynamic and resource 
&onstrained, while the second group were dynamic and less constrained by such factors 
as domestic savings and foreign exchange. Examining each group separately, it was found 
that military expenditures have significantly contributed to the external debt position of 
the constrained group of countries, but not those countries with relatively high foreign 
exchange earning capacity. Given that military expenditures are largely ''unproductive'', 
it appears that the resource constrained countries will face particularly severe problems 
in servicing their external liabilities. 
RESUME 
Cet article vise a identifier Les principales causes de I' endettement public externe 
des pays du Tiers Monde, et plus particulierement le role des dipenses militaires dans cet 
endettement. L' auteur a juge hon, pour Les fins de I' analyse, de diviser Les pays en voie 
de diveloppement en deux groupes : l' un « stagnant » et limite dans ses ressources, I' autre 
« dynamique » et moins restreint par des facteurs tels que I' epargne domestique et Les 
reserves en devises etrangeres. Apres avoir examine Les deux groupes separement, l' auteur 
conclut que Les dipenses militaires ont grandement contribue a I' endettement externe actuel 
des pays du premier groupe, mais non a celui des pays du deuxieme groupe. Etant donne 
le caractere largement « improductif »des depenses militaires, ii semble que Les pays du 
premier groupe vont etre confrontes a de graves problemes pour assurer le remboursement 
de leur dette externe. 
INTRODUCTION 
The debt crisis facing many developing countries has attracted much attention in 
recent years. In large part, most of the analysis of Third World debt has focused on the 
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methods used to finance the rapid rate of increase in external debt and the capacity of the 
developing countries to service the debt. 1 
Few studies,2 however, have attempted to define the motives for debt accumulation, 
other than, for example, to point to the obvious need to finance current account deficits 
due to the oil price shocks. An increasing suspicion among some analysts is that a large 
proportion of existing Third World debt was contracted for the purpose offinancing stepped-
up levels of military expenditure, in general, and arms imports, in particular. 
It is now well-documented, for example, that with little difficulty Argentina was able 
to amass $33 billion in incremental debt between 1978 and 1982, about $5 billion of which 
went to arms purchases. How did this happen? Compared to the traditional contracting terms 
for foreign and/or public sector loans, international capital flows in the 1970s and early 
1980s increasingly came with few strings attached to their use. 3 
It is dear that for most LOCs a large part of the military equipment budget has to 
be spent on imported armaments. According to SIPRI, weapons imports by LOCs rose 
from $1,559 million in 1965 to $10,450 million in 1980--all in constant 1975 prices. This 
trend also coincided with the rapid overall buildup of Third World debt. On the other hand, 
arms imports declined to $9,551 million in 1983 and $7,519 million in 1984,4 a period 
characterized by increased reluctance on the part of international lenders to increase their 
Third World exposures. 
Brzoska5 provides the only attempt to calculate the extent and contribution of LOC 
debt attributable to the military. According to his estimates, by the late 1970s, the net transfer 
of debt would be about twenty to thirty percent less if debt financed weapons imports had 
been absent. 
Weapons purchased with scarce foreign exchange have an obvious allocation cost 
in terms of reduced resources available for the import of intermediate and investment goods 
essential for self-sustaining growth. It. is, of course, true that a reduction in military imports 
would not necessarily imply an equivalent increase in investment, for some leakage in terms 
of consumption or other imports could occur. However, there can be little doubt that lower 
defense imports would improve the situation in terms of foreign exchange scarcity. 6 
The main purpose of the analysis that follows is to extend Brzoska's analysis by 
determining the main causes of the overall external debt accumulated by developing 
countries up to 1982, the extent to which military expenditures contributed to that debt, 
and which groups of developing countries have had their external debt most affected by 
1. See, for example, BAHRAM NOWZAD and RICHARD c. WILLIAMS, External Indebtedness of 
Developing Countries, Occasional Paper, No. 3, Washington, International Monetary Fund, May 1981; E. BRAU 
and R. C. WllLIAMS, Recent.Multilateral Debt Restructurings with Official and Bank Creditors, Occasional Paper, 
No. 25, Washington, International Monetary Fund, December 1983; and K. BURKE DILWN, et. al., Recent 
Developments in External Debt Restructuring, Occasional Paper No. 40, Washington, International Monetary 
Fund, October 1985. 
2. A notable exception is H. ROBERT HELLER and E. FRENKEL, "Determinants of LDC Indebtedness," 
The Columbia Journal of World Business, Spring 1982, 28-34. 
3. Cf. MARTIN SHUBIK and PAUL BRACKEN~ "Strategic Purpose and International Economy,'' Orbis, 
Fall 1983, 567-91 for a detailed account. 
4. Figures are fiurn World Armaments and Disarmament Sf PR/ Yearbook: various issues, Philadelphia, 
Taylor and Frances. 
5. MICHAEL BRWSKA, "The Military-Related External Debt of Third World Countries," Journal of 
Peace Research, 1983, 271-77. 
6. SAADET DEGER and RON SMl1ll, "Military Expenditure and Development: The Economic Link-
ages," IDS Bulletin. October 1985, 52. 
IMPACT OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON THIRD WORLD DEBT 9 
military expenditures. 7 Clearly, since military expenditures are most likely ''unproductive'' 
in the sense of generating a stream of foreign exchange earnings, the results of this analysis 
should throw additional light on the debt servicing capacities of the major indebted Third 
World countries. · 
I. METHODOLOGY 
Regression analysis was first used to determine the statistical association and sig-
nificance of several of the major factors which, in addition to military expenditure, have 
been suggested in the literature as playing a significant role in the expansion of Third World 
debt. 
The first step in the regression analysis was the development of a'relatively simple 
model of Third World debt that could be specified in a form amenable to empirical esti-
mation. The sample used in the construction of the model8 consists of seventy-seven 
developing countries. External de.ht is defined as public external debt owed to non-residents 
and repayable in foreign currency and having a maturity of over one year.9 Note that the 
analysis below is concerned with the volume of external LDC indebtedness rather than the 
price of that debt, or its opportunity costs (the measure used by Brzoska). 
Conceptually, analysis of the volume of debt is much more straightforward than its 
price because most decisions on debt volume are made in terms of one set of criteria, such 
as country limits, key macroeconomic sectors and project specifications-factors that tend 
to be operational. 
On the other hand, the price of debt may be affected by a wide spectrum of qualitative 
factors such as international capital market conditions, prevailing premia and the economic 
policies of the key currency countries as they affect money markets and regional money 
supplies. Clearly, those elements are much more difficult to model than factors affecting 
volume. 
In sum, it was felt that Brzoska's opportunity costs estimates based on the price of 
debt associated with weapons imports would involve too many subjective assumptions to 
be of use in analyzing accumulated debt. Furthermore, Brzoska only estimated the impact 
of arms imports on external debt for individual years. 
II. MODEL FORMULATION 
In selecting variables responsible for the volume of public external debt accumulated 
by 1982, it is reasonable as a first step to assume that country size will have a direct rela-
tionship both to the amount of external indebtedness and the individual country's capacity 
to service this debt. Clearly, a large country as measured by GDP will ceteris paribus have 
7. For Thin! World military producers, 41: is even likely that the need for maintenance, servicing, spare 
parts and capital imports required to sustain indigenous military production causes Third World military producers 
to consume more foreign exchange than they save or generate in earnings. See RON AYRES, "Arms Production 
as a Form of Import Substituting Industrialization: The Turkish Case," World Development, 1983. In any case, 
the foreign exchange component of military expenditures has been shown to be considerable. See PETER TEHRAL, 
"Foreign Exchange Costs of the Indian Military, 1950-72," Journal of Peace Research, 1982, 251-59. 
8. Economic and debt variables are from World Development Report 1984, Wa~hington, The World 
Bank, 1984. Unless otherwise specified, all data are for 1982. 
9. Ibid., p. 280. 
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more financial and commercial relations with the rest of the world economy, and, therefore, 
will be more likely to accumulate a large debt volume than a small country. At the same 
time, due to the diversity of output and resource base, the debt servicing capacity of a large 
country is apt to be greater than that of a small country (and consequently a larger external 
debt can be accumulated). In general, we postulate that the larger the LDC economy as 
measured by its gross domestic product (GDP), the greater its demand for external 
indebtedness. 
Second, a country's external debt should, in general, be related to its general volume 
of merchandise imports. For LDCs, the volume of merchandise imports often tends to have 
a direct relationship to the country's GDP, thus providing an additional source of demand 
for debt. Since in a growing economy a large share of imports will have to be financed, a 
country's indebtedness will be higher as total imports increase. 
Third, an LDC with a greater export volume will be able to service a' larger amount 
of foreign debt. As is well known, export volume is often used by lending institutions as 
a key indicator of debt service capacity. For practical purposes, it is safe to assume that 
lenders' willingness to supply debt varies directly with a country's exports. This relationship 
is particularly important as it relates directly to the export financing of the country. For most 
developing countries, export financing is done in foreign currency since most of the exports 
are denominated in foreign currency as well. In short, we would expect a positive rela-
tionship between country debt and the volume of merchandise exports. 
Fourth, an LDC's overall current account deficit (or surplus) provides the most direct 
impact on external debt, since obviously the size of the deficit is made possible by external 
financing. Clearly, the larger the current account deficit, the larger the overall external public 
debt. 
Fifth, international reserve holdings may be another important factor in affecting the 
volume of a country's external debt: Here the relationship is likely to be more complex. 
Logically, as a country's reserves increase, its ability to service a growing external debt 
and, hence, its credit-worthiness should also increase. On the other hand, everything else 
equal, one might expect that the larger a country's external revenues, the less.pressing the 
need for additional debt to finance imports. Therefore, possession of a large volume of 
international reserves may result in larger or smaller volumes of external debt. 
Finally, three types of governmental expenditures 10-military, health and educa-
tion-11 are introduced as independent variables in the demand for external debt, that is, 
for political or social reasons these expenditures have a high import component and, 
therefore, may be major elements in accounting for the volume of external public debt over 
and above the other demand variables noted above. 
Clearly, because of multicollinearity between the independent variables defined 
above, it is not possibie to determine through regression analysis the percent of LDC public 
external indebtedness stemming from military expenditures. Given this constraint, the 
analysis below attempts to answer the question of whether military expenditures (after 
controlling for GDP, imports, reserves, etc.) have significantly contributed to LDC external 
indebtedness and, if so, what type of envittmments have been most conducive to external 
borrowing for the purpose of increasing military expenditures. 
IU. Military expenditure data are for 1981 and are taken from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1975-82, Washington, D.C., ACDA, 1984. 
11. Government expenditures on education and health are for 1980 and are taken from RlJrH S1v ARD, 
World Military and Social Expenditures, 1983, Washington, D. C., World Priorities, 1983. 
IMPACT OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON THIRD WORLD DEBT 11 
The next step in the analysis is to isolate the main supply and demand influences on 
Third World indebtedness by deriving a reduced form equation that is capable of measuring 
the influence of all independent variables simultaneously. 
In the specification, 12 gross domestic product (GDPB) is the principal demand var-
iable, followed by merchandise imports (MTEB), the current account balance (CAB), and 
the individual public sector expenditures: military expenditures (ME), health (SH) and 
education (SE). 
On the supply side, the main variables are foreign reserves (GIRB) and exports 
(MTEDB). Notationally: 
a) Total debt (PDB) supply = f1 (reserves, exports), and 
b) Total debt (PDB) demand = f2 (GDP, imports, current account balance, military 
expenditures, education expenditures, health expenditures). 
c) Total debt supply = total debt demand. Dividing equations (a) and (b) by the 
equilibrium level of total debt as specified in equation ( c), we obtain equation 
(d) 
d) f1 (total debt) = f2 (totil. debt) expressing equation (d), we can write: 
e) x., f 1 (total debt) - f2 (total debt) = 0, or 
f) x2, (total debt, GDP, imports, reserves, military expenditures, education ex-
penditures, health expenditures, exports, current account balance, imports) = 0, 
or 
g) PDB = f3 (GDPB( + ), MTEB( + ), GIRB( - ), ME(+), SE(+), SH(+), 
MTEA( +),CAB(+)) = 0. 
This last set of relationships provides the equation to be estimated by the regression analysis 
performed below. 
III. REGRESSION RESULTS: TOTAL COUNTRY SAMPLE 
The regression analysis was performed in a step-wise manner. That is, the variable 
most significant in affecting external debt was introduced first, followed in the second 
equation (Table l) by the variables of next importance in contributing to our understanding 
of the variation of external debt across Third World countries. The advantage of this pro-
cedure is that it allows us to assess the marginal contribution additional variables make to 
the determination of the external debt positions of our sample countries. 
The regression results, beginning with the total sample of seventy-seven developing 
countries (the sample size on various specifications fluctuates due to missing observations 
for some of the independent variables), indicated (Table l) as expected the relative im-
portance of GDP (GDPB) in accounting for the observed patterns of LDC public external 
debt (PDB). In fact, by itself, fluctuation in GDP accounts for nearly seventy percent of 
the fluctuations in public external debt (Equation I, Table I). International reserves (GIRB) 
are next in importance and as expected have a negative sign; that is, countries with high 
levels of reserves are not compelled to accrue external debt. 
The current account balance (CAB) is also statistically significant (Equation 3, 
Table I) and has the anticipated sign: the larger the current account deficit, the higher the 
overall level of external indebtedness. These three variables, gross domestic product 
12. As developed by Heller and Frenkel, op. cit. 
Table 1 
Determinant of public external debt ( 1982) total military-non military producers 
Standardized Estimates 
Independent Variables Statistics 
Equation GDPB GIRB CAB ME MTEA MTEB SH SE r2 F DF 
(l) PDB = 0.83 
(13.05) 0.691 170.18 77 
(2) 1.07 ;-0.44 
(18.58) (-7.61) 0.829 177.23 75 
(3) 0.96 -0.24 -0.21 
(13.11) (-2.32) (-2.31) 0.841 116.11 69 
(4) 0.95 -0.27 -0.23 O.o? 
(10.45) (-2.44) (1.92) (0.48) 0.851 85.69 64 
(5) 0.89 -0.37 -0.27 0.04 0.19 
(8.61) (-2.70) (-2.12) (0.30) (1.22) 0.854 68.01 63 
(6) 0.88 -0.37 -0.31 0.05 0.26 -0.06 
(7.51) (-2.58) (-1.56) (0.37) (0.85) (-2.58) 0.854 55.77 63 
(7) 1.16 -0.13 -0.34 -0.29 
(11.39) ( -1.14) (-3.42) (-2.58) 0.856 96.24 69 
(8) 0.68 -0.30 -0.19 0.34 
(4.53) (-2.90) (-2.18) (2.15) 0.851 93.06 69 
Note: Independent variables, GDPB, gross domestic product 1982 (millions of dollars); GIRB, gross international reserves 1982 (miUions of dollars); ME, military expenditures 
1981 (millions of dollars); MTEA, merchandise exports 1982 (millions of dollars); CAB, current account balance 1982 (millions of dollars); SH, Health expenditures 
1980 (millions of dollars); SE, education expenditures 1980 (millions of dollars); PDB public external debt 1982 (millions of dollars). 
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(GDPB), international reserves (GIRB), and current account balance (CAB) account for 
over eighty-four percent of the observed fluctuations in Third World debt. 
On the margin, neither military ex~nditure (ME), exports (MTEA), or imports 
(MTEB) appear to significantly contribute to the regression equation (as indicated by the 
low "t" statistics in parenthesis under the estimated coefficients). On the other hand, health 
expenditures (SH) are statistically significant, with a negative sign, and education ex-
penditures (SE) are statistically significant with a positive sign. Neither variable, however, 
makes a major improvement in the r2 obtained in Equation 3, Table 1. 
On the whole, therefore, it appears that on the margin (after controling for GDP, 
reserves, and current account deficits) military expenditures have not played a significant 
role in affecting the external debt accrued by our total sample of less developed countries. 
IV. EXAMINATION OF SUB-GROUPINGS OF COUNTRIES: 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
While the results above indicated that military expenditures are likely to have played 
a significant role in contributing to the overall level of external debt accrued by 1982, several 
accounts 13 exist detailing massive external borrowing by several less developed countries 
occurring simultaneously with military build-ups. On the other hand, it is quite logical to 
expect that high levels of military expenditures in countries with poor export prospects face 
lenders who, because they are fearful of the country's ability to service increased external 
debt, actually lower their exposures in those economies. If this hypothesis is true, the in-
conclusive results obtained above may have stemmed from the fact that two opposing forces 
were at work. More specifically, if, in fact, a large group of credit-worthy countries was 
increasing their external debt to finance stepped-up defense expenditures, while simul-
taneously another group of countries was experiencing cutbacks in the availability of ex-
ternal funds due to high existing levels of military expenditure and poor export prospects, 
the net effect for the total sample might be nil. That is, developments in one group of 
countries might neutralize the opposite effects taking place in the other group so that sta-
tistically no pattern between debt and military expenditures would exist for the sample as 
a whole. 
Several studies14 have, in fact, indicated that developing countries may lack ho-
mogeneity with regard to the impact that defense expenditures have on the overall economic 
growth of the country. Frederiksen and Looney contend that 15 
One can argue that under certain circumstances defense spending can help growth while under a different 
set of circumstances. it can hinder growth. Indeed, both propositions are likely to be true for the same 
country at different points in time. 
On the positive side, defense spending may contribute to the growth of the civilian economy by: I) feeding, 
clothing and housing a number of people who would otherwise have to be fed. housed and clothed by 
13. See, for example, those in Shubik and Bracken, op. cit. 
14. See P. C. FREDERIKSEN and R. E. hooNEY, "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries: Some Further Empirical Evidence," Journal <1fEco11omic De1•elop111e111. July 1982. 113-
125; P. C. FREDERIKSEN and R. E. l...ooNEY, "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries," Armed Forces and Societv, Summer 1983, 633-645; P. C. FREDERIKSEN and R. E. LlXJNEY. "Another 
Llxik at Defense Spending and Eco~omic Growth in Developing Countries." Defense Analysis. Forthcoming 
1985; and P. C. FREDERIKSEN and R. E. LlxlNEY, "Defense Expenditures and Economic Gmwth in Developing 
Countries: A Reply,'' Armed Forces and Sodety•, Winter 1985. 298-301. 
15. P. C. FREDERIKSEN and R. E. LlxlNEY, "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Devel-
oping Countries: Some Further Empirical Evidence," op. cit .• 117. 
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the civilian economy; 2) providing education and medical care as well as vocational and technical training; 
3) engaging in a variety of public works-roads, dams, river improvements, airports, communication 
networks, etc.-that may in pan serve civilian uses; and 4) engaging in scientific and technical specialties 
which would otherwise have to be performed by civilian personnel. 
They add that on the negative side: 16 
There are at least three different types of possible effects. The first, named the ''income shift" by Benoit, 
is that increases in defense expenditures will reduce the civilian GDP and will thus tend to decrease growth 
proportionately. Second, it is possible that defense spending adversely affects growth since the government 
sector for the most pan exhibits "negligible rates of measurable productivity increases." Finally, growth 
can suffer since increased spending on defense uses resources which could have been better employed 
as civilian investment. 
Frederiksen and Looney note that while these arguments make intuitive sense, the 
crucial determinant of the impact of defense expenditures on economic· growth is the 
country's financial resource constraint. According to them, a country which is severely 
resource constrained (which faces some combination of lagging taxes, reduced private and 
government savings, reduced borrowing power overseas, export shortfalls, etc.) will 
probably face budget cuts. In order to maintain defense programs, the high growth 
development programs will be sacrificed: 17 
This is likely for two reasons. First, it is usually more politically acceptable to curtail capital investment 
(on infrastructure, for example) than expenditures on the current account. Second, given that a well-
established military establishment already exists, there will be obvious pressure to maintain the status 
quo. These special interest groups might include high ranking officers, military contractors, and certain 
political groups. As budgets are reduced, the military share is frozen and the brunt of the deflationary 
policy is borne by development projects which we assume are relatively productive. In short, defense 
expenditures are likely to be asymmetric--<lifficult to cut back but easily expanded. Thus, for resource-
constrained countries, we should expect a negative relationship between defense spending and economic 
growth. 
The authors contend that the opposite is likely to hold for countries with a relative 
abundance of financial resources-an elastic supply of tax revenues, a high inflow of foreign 
exchange and the like: 18 
These countries can more easily afford the capital investment programs necessary for economic growth 
while maintaining or even increasing defense programs. 
They conclude that19 
If this thesis is correct, one can see why previous authors have failed to find any consistency between 
economic growth and defense. Using a model based on resource constraints, however, it is easy to see 
why developing countries with identical levels of defense spending can experience very different growth 
levels: richer countries are apparently able to invest in development programs while, on the other hand, 
poorer countries have had to sacrifice these programs to pay for defense. 
Since their hypothesized relationship between defense and economic growth de-
pended on financial resource constraints, their sample of developing countries was separated 
into either a resource constrained or unconstrained group by means of cluster analysis. While 
a large number of conceivable proxy measures could be used to indicate the relative 
abundance or scarcity of financial resources, the selection of those used in the cluster 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid., 118. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
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analysis was based on the ratios of gross domestic investment to GDP in 1960 and 1978 
and the ratios of gross domestic savings to GDP in 1960 and 1978. 20 The cluster analysis 
produced two distinct groups: one having high levels of savings and investment to GDP, 
the other having low ratios of savings and investment to GDP. 
Linear regression equations were estimated for each group:21 
The most striking result, and one that supports our hypothesis, is that the coefficient of the defense variable 
was positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent level for the richer group. While the coefficient 
level for the defense variables for the poorer group was negative (as hypothesized) it was not statistically 
different from zero. 
Based on the above-cited results, it makes sense to split our sample of developing 
countries into groups based on some measure of resource constraint. Presumably, those 
countries who have either more domestic resources (savings and investment) or more access 
to foreign capital (everything else equal, such as gross national product) will be able to 
support a higher level of defense expenditures. On the other hand, those countries with a 
lower level of domestic resources or less access to international capital (everything else 
equal) will not have as high a level of defense expenditures. 
V. EXAMINATION OF SUB-GROUPINGS OF COUNTRIES: 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Given the necessity to separate our sample of countries into sub-groupings, the 
question remains as to the best operational method for accomplishing this task. The analysis 
of Frederiksen and Looney summarized above indicated that a fruitful division of countries 
for analysis of military expenditures is on the basis of their relative resource constraints. 
A number of variables reflect' relative resource scarcity in developing countries. These 
include measures of savings, investment, capital flows, debt servicing, exports, imports 
and the like. The statistical problem is that many of these measures are highly correlated 
with each other and, as such, are redundant in providing information as to resource scarcity. 
One solution to this problem is to simply pick several variables-savings, exports, 
for example-and create two groups of countries: one with high savings and exports, the 
unconstrained group and the other with low savings and exports, the relatively constrained 
group. This procedure suffers from the fact that selection of variables is somewhat arbitrary. 
More importantly, some countries are likely to have low rates of savings and high exports 
or vice versa and thus will be difficult to classify. 
In order to make the analysis that follows as objective as possible, a large number 
of variables reflective of resource scarcity were selected as an initial data set. These in-
dependent variables were then factor analyzed. The advantage of factor analysis is that by 
determining the common variance among the independent variables, it enables the re-
searcher to objectively reduce the number of variables that need to be retained for further 
analysis. 
The factor analysis found out of if sample of thirty-four variables seven major in-
dependent measures of resource scarcity. The variables most representative of each trend 
were: 1) Gross inflow of public loans/exports 1982; 2) total public external debt 1982; 
3) gross international reserves 1982; 4) public external debt as a% of GDP 1982; 5) growth 
20. Data taken from World Bank, World Development Repon, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1980. 
21. Ibid. 
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in imports 1970-82; 6) external debt service as a % of GDP 1982; and 7) public external 
debt as a% of GDP 1970. 
The next step in creating sub-groupings of countries based on their relative resource 
scarcity was to utilize the seven variables above·as discriminating variables in a discriminant 
analysis. 22 Using these seven variables, the discriminant analysis split the countries into 
two groupings based on their relative attainment of each of the seven variables, that is, the 
countries were profiled into two composite groups (Table 2) based on their relative resource 
abundance as reflected in the seven measures of scarcity. 
Group I countries, in general, seem to be the poorer, less economically dynamic 
nations, this group being heavily weighted with African and poorer Latin American 
countries. The Group II countries consist of several major oil exporters and several of the 
more dynamic newly industrializing nations, such as Mexico, Greece, India, Korea, Spain, 
Algeria and Malaysia. ' 
Further insight into the two groups can be gained by examining the means of the 
variables used in the discriminant analysis (Table 3): 
l. Group I countries resorted to a much higher (3. 6 times) inflow of external public 
loans in 1982 relative to their exports that year. 
2. On the other hand, the overall level of total public external debt in 1982 averaged 
nearly four and one half times as much for Group II countries than is the case 
for Group I countries. 
3. The level of international reserves is also much higher for Group II countries-
nearly ten times as much as the average for Group I countries. 
4. With regard to shares of debt in gross domestic product, however, Group I 
countries have much higher levels of attainment, averaging nearly twice as much 
as Group II countries in both 1970 and 1982. The debt service ratio to exports 
is correspondingly higher for Group I countries. 
5. The rate of growth of imports was nearly ten times higher over the 1970-82 
period for Group II countries. 
In terms of profiles, therefore, Group II countries are considerably larger, more 
affluent, and less reliant on external debt as a percentage of gross domestic product. They 
tend to spend relatively large amounts on military activities, but not necessarily significantly 
greater amounts of their overall budgets. 
Given the contrasting economic environments between the two types of countries, 
it is logical to expect that the determinants of external debt varied considerably between 
groups. 
To test for the role of military expenditures in affecting the external debt position 
of each sub-group of countries, regressions similar to those performed for the total sample 
of countries (Table 1) were undertaken. 
As anticipated, a much different pattern appears for Group I countries when analyzed 
separately (Table 4). For this sample of countries, gross domestic product (GDPB) and 
international reserves (GIRB) account for dnly fifty percent of the observed fluctuations 
in total public external debt with international reserves having a positive sign. Adding 
22. See SAS Users Guide, Statistics, 1982 Edition, Cary, N.C., SAS Institute, 1982, for a description 
of the program. The sample countries were initially assigned an arbitrary one or zero so that placement could 
be made into two groups. A three-group division of countries did not produce a clear split between the means 
of the groups, i.e., there was not a high probability of correct placement for each country in one of these groups. 



















17. Dominican Republic 
18. Liberia 
19. Ivory Coast 
20. Mauritania 








29. Ceo. African Rep. 
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31. Burma 








Discriminant analysis total sample countries 
based on economic factor analysis high loadings 
Group II 
Probability of 
Correct Placement Country 
69.34 I. Greece 
83.48 2. India 
60.73 3. Nigeria 
66.47 4. Indonesia 
92.64 5. Egypt 
86.27 6. Korea 
86.46 7. Rwanda 
68.31 8. Turkey 
73.06 9. Spain 
54.91 IO. Venezuela 
91.40 11. Mexico 
65.90 12. Brazil 
97.12 13. Algeria 
86.98 14. Philippines 
60.02 15. Libya 
56.61 16. Colombia 
74.12 17. Thailand 
94.77 18. Malaysia 
84.42 19. Argentina 
96.04 20. Saudi Arabia 
~6.05 21. Kuwait 
94.37 22. Syria 









































military expenditure (ME), however, in~reases the overall correlation coefficient to over 
eighty-three percent (Equation 3, Table 4) with military expenditures being highly 
significant. 
Imports (MTEB) were also significant when added to the regression equation, as was 
expenditure on education (SE). As noted above, Group I countries tend to be characterized 
by relatively low rates of growth in imports, as compared to Group II (1.0 percent vs. 
9.5 percent over the 1970-82 period), together with much higher levels of public external 
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Table 3 
Structural and performance differences between Group I 
and Group U countries 
(Means) 
Total 
Symbol Variable Sample 
Expon-External Variables 
FEB Share of fuels, minerals in merchandise exports 1982 32.4 
EI Export instability 1968-71 9.1 
ZGB Growth in imports 197(}.82 4.0 
EGB Growth in exports 197(}.82 1.8 
EGA Growth in exports 196(}. 70 8.0 
EB Share of Exports in GDP 1982 25.2 
CAA Current account Balance 1970 -119.I 
CAB Current account Balance 1982 -382.7 
OPCEB Share of other primary commodities in exports 1982 44.3 
IMPFB Share of food imports in merchandise imports 1982 14.4 
External Debt Variables 
PDA External public debt 1970 735.5 
PDB External public debt 1982 6098.5 
POPA External public debt as % GDP 1970 16.I 
PDPB External public debt as % GDP 1982 34.8 
DSEA External public debt as % exports 1970 8.1 
DSEB External public debt as % exports 1982 14.4 
BCIBE Gross inflow of public external debt as % exports 1982 0.6 
Fiscal-Savings Variables 
AS Average national savings 197(}.8 I 17.1 
MS Average marginal national survey 197(}.8 I 12.6 
RTCR YB Government revenues as % GDP 1982 20.9 
GETYB Government expenditures as % GDP 1982 26.3 
GOB Government deficits as% of GDP 1982 -5.0 
Composition of GDP 
AB Share of agriculture in GDP 1982 23.4 
18 Share of industry in GDP 1982 30.8 
MB Share of manufactures in GDP 1982 14.1 
SB Share of services in GDP 1982 45.8 
Performance Variables 
GDPGB Growth in GDP 197(}.82 4.4 
IMFB Inflation 197(}.82 20.3 
GDIGB Growth investment 1978-82 5.9 
GDIB Share of investment in GDP 1982 22.0 
ICOR Investment capital output ratio 1968-73 3.8 
GIRA Gross international reserves 1970 298.3 
GIRB Gross international reserves 1982 2 699.8 
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654.9 6 138.8 
2.4 3.5 
borrowing as a percent of exports and GDP. Apparently, these countries are resource 
constrained in the sense that they rely on public external borrowing as a major source of 
foreign exchange. The low growth in imports for this group as a whole suggests foreign 
exchange may be rationed to one extent or another with governments not able to rely on 
taxes from exports to fund the bulk of their expenditures. In this environment, increased 
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public external debt may be the only way of maintaining or increasing military (and perhaps 
educational) expenditures available to governments. The statistical significance of mer-
chandise imports (MTEB) in the debt regres,sions is consistent with this interpretation, as 
is the low degree of significance of gross domestic product (GDPB) in the regression 
equations. 
The results for Group II countries are in marked contrast to those for Group I pre-
sented above. In the case of the Group II countries (Table 5), military expenditures do not 
appear to have contributed to the overall accumulation of public external debt. In fact, when 
regressed with merchandise imports (MTEA) public external debt in 1970 (PDA) and 
merchandise imports (MTEB), military expenditures take on a negative sign and are sta-
tistically significant (Equation 6, Table 5). 
The negative sign on merchandise imports (MTEB) may indicate that, in general, 
this group of countries has not been reliant on public external debt for financing the bulk 
of its imports. (In fact, their fast rate of growth of imports-9.5 percent per annum over 
the 1970-82 period-may have been financed largely out of export earnings.) That the 
export prospects of this group of countries is good is evidenced by the positive sign on 
merchandise exports (MTEA) in the regression equations, that is, that these countries' 
export position increases their overall credit-worthiness. The relatively low debt service 
ratios for this group of countries indicates that, in general, they are relatively resource 
unconstrained and that increased military expenditures have, in large part, been funded 
out of expanded government revenues rather than external indebtedness. 
To sum up, the use of public external indebtedness to finance military expenditures 
does not appear to be universal among developing countries. In fact, it is possible that a 
large group of relatively debt-free (debt as a percent of GDP), resource unconstrained 
countries (Group II above) have contained military expenditures within the limits imposed 
by self-financing, rather than risk jeopardizing their overall credit-worthiness. 
On the other hand, the bulk of debt accumulated by the other group of LDCs (Group I 
above), characterized as being relatively undynamic and resource constrained, has stemmed 
from military expenditures and, presumably, arms imports. Apparently, the perceived need 
to expand defense expenditures by this group in the face of foreign exchange shortages has 
resulted in relatively high levels of external indebtedness measured either as a percent of 
exports or imports obtained for the group as a whole. 
VI. RESULTS: MILITARY PRODUCERS AND NON-MILITARY PRODUCERS 
Clearly, the grouping of countries presented above is only one of many possible ways 
of identifying contrasting environments in which external debt is accumulated and decisions 
are made as to the financing of military expenditures. Another logical splitting of countries 
based on differing environments for the purpose of examining the financing of military 
expenditures is on the basis of the presence or absence of indigenous arms production. One 
might expect, for example, Third World eountries capable of producing at least one major 
weapons system23 to have a different level of technical and industrial capabilities than 
countries without an indigenous arms industry. Furthermore, the linkages between military 
expenditures and the economy, together with the import component of military equipment 
23. For purposes of classification, military producers are defined as those countries currently producing 
at least one major weapons system. See STEPHANIE NEUMAN, "Third World Military Industries," International 
Organization, Winter 1984, 172-73. 
Table4 
Determinants of public external debt ( 1982) Group I countries 
• N (Standardized Estimates) 0 
Independent Variables Statistics 
Equation GDPB GIRB ME MTEA MTEB CAB PDA SE SH r2 F DF 
(I) PDB = 0.63 
(4.73) 0.377 22.41 35 
(2) 0.41 0.37 (") > (2.79) (2.52) 0.495 16.13 35 z 
> (3) 0.18 -0.15 0.91 0 
(1.86) ( - 1.34) (7.73) 0.832 47.69 32 > z (4) O.o7 -0.42 0.80 0.48 ..... 
(0.75) (-3.38) (7.62) (3.45) 0.882 52.24 32 0 c 
(5) 0.08 ...:o.40 0.55 0.10 0.59. ::c z 
(I.I I) (-3.81) (5.04) (0.64) (3.64) 0.921 62.71 32 > r 
(6) 0.10 -0.36 0.53 0.66 0 
(l.4b) (-4.09) (5.08) (5.53) 0.920 79.96 32 'Tl 0 (7) 0.07 -0.37 0.48 0.65 -0.12 tT1 
< (1.06) (-4.28) (4.64) (5.51) (- 1.64) 0.925 66.61 32 tT1 
r (8) 0.10 -0.36 0.52 0.69 -0.12 0 
(1.31) (-4.00) (4.61) (5.47) (-0.20) 0.917 63.39 33 ...., :::: (9) 0.09 -0.33 0.45 0.56 0.19 tT1 z (1.36) (-3.81) (4.10) (4.37) (1.95) 0.929 71.12 32 --3 
(10) 0.10 -0.36 0.54 0.66 0.01 en 
--3 
(1.36) (-3.80) (4.82) (5.38) (0.08) 0.920 61.71 32 c S2 (11) 0.10 -0.25 0.74 0.36 tT1 
(1.31) (-2.49) (5.12) (3.25) 0.886 60.08 35 en 
(12) 0.11 -0.33 1.00 0.11 
(1.32) (-2.76) (7.75) '(1.02) 0.852 44.55 35 
(13) 0.89 
(11.41) 0.800 130.09 34 
Note: See text for definition of symbols 
DF = degrees offreedom 
F2 = statistic 
r2 = correlation coefficient 
( ) ~ t statistic 
-N Table5 
Determinants of public external debt (1982) Group II countries 
.... (Standardized Estimates) 
t:Q 
Ill 
0 Independent Variables Statistics 
0 
...J Equation GOPB GIRB ME MTEA POA MTEB CAB SH SE r2 F OF iii:: 
0 
~ (1) POB = 0.63 
0 (3.72) 0.401 22.37 21 ci:: 
s:: (2) 0.87 -0.59 
.... (6.39) (-4.32) 0.702 22.37 21 z 
0 (3) 0.87 -0.66 O.IO 
ell (6.18) (-2.70) (0.43) 0.717 44.37 20 Ill 
ci:: (4) 0.77 -0.90 -0.19 0.60 ~ (5.58) (-3.45) (-0.69) (1.90) 0.769 13.33 20 
z (5) 0.50 -0.82 -0.44 0.91 0.35 
~ (2.97) (-3.51) (-1.64) (2.93) (2.31) 0.829 14.63 20 
:>< (6) 0.77 -0.79 -0.45 1.29 0.27 -0.61 Ill 
>- (4.69) (-4.17) (-2.08) (4.55) (2.14) (-2.96) 0.895 19.69 20 
ci:: (7) 1.16 -0.95 0.38 
-i: 
!:::: (6.13) (-3.37) (1.46) 0.733 16.52 21 
~ (8) 1.30 -0.48 -0.14 -0.54 
~ (7.36) (-2.IO) (-0.85) (-4.34) 0.863 26.93 21 (9) 0.62 -0.95 0.83 0.18 -0.48 . 0.21 
ti (2.00) (-4.52) (2.86) (1.39) (-1.90) (0.77) 0.849 14.10 21 
~ 
~ Note: See text for definition of symbols 
OF = degrees of freedom 
F2 = statistic 
r2 = correlation coefficient 
( ) = t statistic 
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associated with the given level of military expenditures should be considerably different 
for arms and non-arms producers. The ability of a Third World country to produce its own 
anns is dependent on the following components:24 l) Financial resources; 2) level of in-
dustrial development; 3) scientific and education potential; and 4) organizational and po-
litical abilities. 
Limited economic and financial resources explain, at least partially, the difficulties 
of Third World countries in developing an independent weapons industry. The development 
of an anns industry, especially a totally independent one, requires very large amounts of 
financial resources. These are often beyond the abilities of most Third World states. It is 
well known that even some of the advanced industrial nations such as Britain and France 
have been compelled to cancel military production plans due to financial difficulties. 
In short, we might expect that countries with relatively abundant sources of foreign 
exchange and domestic savings capable of being appropriated by governments are likely 
to be the anns producers. 
In general, we would imagine the non-anns producers to be much more reliant on 
imports of military equipment to meet a given level of defense expenditures and, fur-
thermore, given the high cost of sophisticated imported weaponry, we would expect a high 
proportion of it (everything else equal) to be financed by external debt. 
Finally, to the extent that Third World countries produce their own weapons systems, 
we would expect a lesser relationship to exist between military expenditure and overall 
public external indebtedness; equipment can be obtained from local sources in addition to 
imports, with added domestic inputs occurring when the country's credit-worthiness might 
be placed in jeopardy by additional external borrowing to finance anns acquisitions. 
The results for the sample of fifty-six non-anns producing LDCs indicate that, in 
fact, military expenditures have significantly contributed to public external debt (Table 6). 
For those countries, military expenditUres (ME), together with GDP (GDPB), international 
reserves (GIRB), exports (MfEA), and the balance of payments deficit on current account 
(CAB) account for over eighty percent of the observed variance in public external debt. 
This group of countries has also expanded health (SH) and education (SE) expenditures 
through increased public external indebtedness (Equations 7, 8, Table 6). 
If we can assume that anns producing LDCs are more technically and industrially 
advanced than the non-anns producing LDCs, the generally low level of technical and 
industrial sophistication of these countries appears to have resulted in a great need for fi-
nancing current account deficits through external borrowing, that is the Jack of domestic 
sources of many necessary manufactured items. Merchandise exports (MTEA) are used 
to establish credit-worthiness for this purpose. Given the shortage of indigenous supplies 
and personnel, these countries may also be reliant on foreign technicians and inputs to 
maintain and expand their educational and health programs. 
The anns producing LDCs, on the other hand (Table 7), appear to expand external 
public debt simply· in line with their overall financial and commercial relations with the 
rest of the world. GDP (GDPB) for these countries accounts for eighty percent of the ob-
served fluctuations in external public debt "'ith no other independent variables statistically 
significant at the ninety-five percent level (although GIRB is significant at the ninety percent 
level). 
24. ILAN PELEG, "Military Production in Third World Countries: A Political Study," in PAT Mc:Gow AN, 

































Determinant of public external debt (1982) non military producers 
Standardized Estimates 
Independent Variables Statistics 
Equation GDPB GIRB CAB ME MTEA MTEB SH SE r' F OF 
(l) PDB = 0.24 
(l.88) 0.061 3.52 56 
(2) 1.98 -1.86 
(7.34) (-6.87) 0.509 26.95 54 
(3) 2.04 -0.40 -1.59 
(9.31) (-1.20) (-5.87) 0.720 38.57 48 
(4) 1.46 0.05 -2.65 1.18 
(4.73) (0.14) (-5.58) (2.64) 0.760 3+.79 44 
(5) 1.21 - 1.68 -3.41 1.02 2.86 
(4.00) (-2.44) (-6.62) (2.43) (2.87) 0.801 30.66 43 
(6) 1.15 2.44 -2.61 0.70 2.31 0.91 
(3.80) (-2.65) -3.17) (l.44) (2.12) (1.24) 0.809 26.18 43 
(7) 0.91 -1.05 -J.17 1.43 
(4.36) (-4.44) (-6.24) (7.63) 0.880 80.29 48 
(8) 1.46 - 1.26 -0.88 0.82 
(6.06) (-3.47) (-2.97) (3.93) ·0.793 42.08 48 
Note: Independent variables, GOPB, gross domestic product 1982 (millions of dollars); GIRB, gross international reserves 1982 (millions of dollars); ME, military expenditures 
1981 (millions of dollars); MTEA, merchandise exports 1982 (millions of dollars); CAB, current account balance 1982 (millions of dollars); SH, Health expenditures 
1980 (millions of dollars); SE, education expenditures 1980 (millions of dollars); POB public external debt 1982 (millions of dollars). 
OF = degrees of freedom; F = F statistic; r2 = correlation coefficient; ( ) = t statistic 
Table? 
Determinant of public external debt ( 1982) total military producers 
Standardized Estimates 
Independent Variables Statistics 
Equation GDPB GIRB CAB ME MTEA MTEB SH SE ri F DF 
(I) PDB = 0.89 
(8.72) 0.800 76.11 20 
(2) 0.92 -0.16 
(9.23) (-1.62) 0.826 42.65 20 
(3) 1.08 -0.18 0.20 
(7.il) (-1.88) (1.47) 0.845 30.99 20 
(4) 1.09 -0.16 0.21 -0.01 
(6.96) (-1.62) (1.46) (-0.05) 0.861 23.32 19 
(5) 1.04 -0.20 0.22 -0.01 0.11 
(6.14) (-1.83) (1.46) (-0.10) (0.91) 0.869 18.59 19 
(6) 0.95 -0.18 0.14 0.04 0.40 -0.30 
(5.26) (-1.71) (0.92) (0.32) (1.47) (-1.18) 0.881 16.16 19 
(7) 1.08 -0.12 -0.20 
(5.96) (-1.22) (0.58) 0.829 27.51 20 
(8) 0.78 -0.17 0.16 
(2.86) (-1.65) (0.58) 0.829 27.51 20 
Note: Independent variables, GDPB, gross domestic product 1982 (millions of dollars); GIRB, gross international reserves 1982 (niillions of dollars); ME, military expenditures 
1981 (millions of dollars); MTEA, merchandise exports 1982 (millions of dollars); CAB, current account balance 1982 (millions of dollars); SH, Health expenditures 
1980 (millions of dollars); SE, education expenditures 1980 (millions of dollars); PDB public external debt 1982 (millions of dollars). 
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Table 8 
Structural, performance and defense expenditure differences Third World military, 
non-military producers 
(Means) 
Arms Non- Total 
Symbol Variable Producers Producers Sample 
External - Balance of Payments 
RBB Resource balance 1982 -5.I -12.2 -10.2 
WA Growth in imports, 1960-70 5.4 6.0 5.8 
WB Growth in imports, 1970-82 5.7 3.8 4.3 
EGA Growth in exports, 1960-70 5.7 9.6 8.5 
EGB Growth in exports, 1970-82 5.0 -0.3 I. I 
CAA Current account balance 1970 -353.5 -22.0 -127.7 
CAB Current account balance 1982 -2 964.8 837.8 -340.5 
External Debt 
PDA External public debt 1970 I 670.7 240.2 620.5 
PDB External public debt 1982 13 299.1 I 941.3 4 960.5 
PDP External public debt o/o GDP, 1970 15.5 39.9 33.3 
PDPB External public debt o/o GDP, 1980 26.9 4.7 37.8 
PBCB Public external borrowing commitments 1982 3 798.7 377.0 510.3 
PBCBE Public external borrowing commitments 1.0 0.5 0.7 
ECNIB Net inflow of publicly guaranteed external capital I 582.2 173.2 547.7 
Fiscal-Savings 
AS Average national savings, 1970-81 20.2 15.4 16.7 
MS Average marginal savings, 1970-81 19.7 9.9 12.5 
PCB Government consumption o/o GDP, 1982 
GDIB Gross domestic investment o/o GDP, 1982 14.0 17.2 16.2 
Composition of GDP 
AB Share of agriculture in GDP, 1982 17.4 28.I 25.I 
MB Share of manufacturing in GDP, 1982 18.8 10.8 13.I 
EB Share of exports in GDP, 1982 30.0 26.7 27.6 
Defense Expenditures 
ME Military expenditures 1981 I 863.7 I 013.I I 247.0 
AF Armed Forces 1981 240.7 71.1 116.5 
MEY Military expenditure share of GDP 1981 4.0 5.8 5.4 
MEP Military expenditure per capita 112.1 158.4 145.7 
Performance Variables 
EI Export instability index, 1967-71 8.6 10.8 10.2 
GDPGA Growth in GDP, 1960-1970 5.8 5.4 5.5 
GDPGB Growth in GDP, 1970-80 5.5 3.9 4.3 
Gross international reserves, 1970 536.4 141.9 253.2 
Gross international reserves, 1982 3 869.9 I 495.6 2 148.5 
Per capita income I 862.3 I 886.6 I 879.9 
Size Variables 
Area I 280.2 502.8 695.0 
Gross Domestic Product, 1982 59 203.2 10 387.5 23 981.8 
Population, 1982 73.2 11.3 26.6 
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These countries must be relatively industrially and technically more diversified, with 
a number of options for domestic vs. external inputs into their industrial and military 
complexes. No general pattern, therefore, exi_sts between military, health, or educational 
expenditures and overall external debt. 
An examination of the means of various indicators of economic performance 
(Table 8), external debt and structural composition of the arms and non-arms producers 
throws additional light on the regression results presented above. In general, the arms 
producers can be characterized as possessing much higher levels of domestic savings, less 
export instability, superior export performance, higher external debt but a much lower debt 
burden (as a percent of GDP), and higher capital inflows than the non-arms producing 
countries. 
In fact, in a recent study Looney and Frederiksen, 25 using discriminant analysis, 
indicated that a nearly perfect classification of Latin American arms producers and non-
arms producers could be made using only debt and import-export indicators as discrimi-
nating variables. That study also demonstrated that military and size variables were not 
capable of discriminating between arms producers and non-producers. Interestingly enough, 
debt and external variables and their relative magnitudes are nearly identical to those used 
to discriminate between Group I and Group II countries above, with producers very similar 
to Group II countries and non-producers, in general, profiling in a manner similar to 
Group I. 
Apparently, it is not arms production (or non-arms production per se) that determines 
the extent to which military expenditures impact on Third World debt, but instead the 
general ability of these countries to generate diversified sources of foreign exchange, (thus 
maintaining high growth rates in imports) that ultimately determine the degree of inde-
pendence of increased military expenditures on external public indebtedness. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main question posed at the beginning of this paper was whether or not military 
expenditures have contributed to Third World public external debt. In general, the results 
presented above indicate that the answer is no, but that for certain LDCs it is likely that a 
high percent of the external public debt accumulated by 1982 was the result of expanded 
military expenditures in the 1970s. 
What is the best characterization of LDCs who have relied on public external in-
debtedness to finance military expenditures? Two possible country types were identified-
undynamic resource constrained countries (Group I above) and countries that did not have 
an indigenous arms industry. Based on the regression results, it appears that the resource 
constrained LDCs best characterize Third World countries whose external public debt has 
been used in large part to fund increased military spending. Interestingly enough, the non-
arms producing LDCs as a whole have this pattern given the high debt service ratios which 
characterize the group. This fact, togeth61" with the generally "unproductive" nature of 
military expenditures, make it unlikely that this group of countries as a whole will be in 
a position to significantly expand military expenditures in the near future. At best, this group 
of countries will be lucky to be able to service their existing public debt. 
25. ROBERT LlJoNEY and p. c. FREDERIKSEN, "Profiles of Latin American Arms Producers," Inter-
national Organizations, forthcoming. 
